Sovereignty, Diplomacy, and Democracy: The Changing Character of “International” Representation—from State to Self?

Alan K. Henrikson

A “nation,” as distinct from a state, is a composite entity. It has unity, but also multiplicity. Can diplomacy, traditionally understood as the process by which sovereign states deal with each other, accommodate the participation of masses—a nation’s people themselves? An essential element and characteristic of diplomacy is its representativeness, which philosophically is a very complicated problem. It is not easy to explain how a person, or thing, can “stand for” someone, or something, else—or to know what, exactly, the entity being re-presented (made “present again”) is. In diplomacy, representation, though a concept rarely analyzed, is fundamental. As Paul Sharp, an especially thoughtful academic student of the subject has stated, diplomacy “is built upon the notion of representation.”

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The very first “function” of a diplomatic mission, as listed in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961), is declared to be, as it historically had been: “Representing the sending State in the receiving State.”

In the past, it was the sovereign who was represented by diplomatic mission. Although Louis XIV of France, the Sun King, probably never actually said, “L’État, c’est moi,” French ambassadors in his time were very much his personal emissaries. Today, kingdoms are rare, and “royal” embassies, too, are few: the Royal Norwegian Embassy, the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, and the Royal Embassy of Cambodia being among them. Sovereign representation today encompasses all kinds of states. In a republic, such as the United States of America, diplomacy is assumed to be “democratic,” in substance as well as in style. The American innovation, “public diplomacy,” a concept that The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy helped to originate, might even be understood to derive from the theory of popular sovereignty.

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In the diplomacy of any nation, irrespective of its form of government, it is, in the final analysis, the individual who participates, whether in an official capacity or completely unofficially. Especially when participation is not formally authorized, it may not be clear whose interest or policy is being represented. Partly with this general problem in mind, the United States Congress in 1799 passed the Logan Act, which made it illegal for any citizen, without authorization, to engage in a negotiation whose purpose was to influence the action of a foreign government relating to a controversy with the United States.

Private “diplomacy” thus was not allowed.

The increasing variety of available means of communication today increases the scope and complexity of the “international” process. Communication across national lines can be physical and immediate—“face to face”—or distant and technologically mediated—“virtual.” Anyone can participate. Control of the process is difficult. The WikiLeaks story and the odyssey of Edward Snowden, the National Security Agency contractor who released information worrisome to other governments as well as of concern to the United States, are present-day cases in point. It
nearly always is an individual person—authorized or not—who conveys a message internationally, and who may be the original source of the political information and policy ideas it contains.

In what follows, I shall review how, over the centuries, the character of international representation has changed, with a focus on the interplay between the States and the Self as the actor. Following brief commentaries on the concepts of Sovereignty, Diplomacy, Democracy, and the nature of diplomatic representation, I shall explore the evolution of international diplomacy by making reference to a selection of thinkers—starting with Thomas Hobbes, and proceeding to Niccolò Machiavelli, to Cardinal Richelieu and François de Callières, to Harold Nicolson, to Henry Kissinger, to Jorge Heine, and, finally, to Manuel Castells, a sociologist rather than diplomatist. The writings of all illuminate the problem of how a society, not just its leaders but its other members as well, can interact “internationally.”

There have been profound changes in the way participants in diplomacy, today not only representatives of governments, “present” themselves abroad. There has been a shift, gradual but increasingly noticeable, from the sovereign State as the sole representative of the “nation” to the individual, personal Self—the irreducible unit of which societies are made. Although this development may seem radically new, it was latent in the thinking of the seventeenth century with the formation of the theory of the social contract, and later with the development of the philosophy of liberalism. Less and less was the State thought of as a single, integrated, corporate entity—a “body.” Rather, it is composed of bodies—millions of increasingly independent decision centers.

Sovereignty, once considered to be all-encompassing conceptually and also geographically confining, is breaking up. It is becoming fractionated and de-territorialized. Just as society is becoming atomized internally, the populations of most nations today, no longer limited in their physical movements or their access to information, are becoming globalized. In this new context, individuals are able to represent themselves, and, more and more, they are doing so. With the aid of the Internet and the use of social media, they enter into the blogosphere, and “re-present” themselves
to others, known and unknown, in other parts of the world. Physically too, they go abroad, in their own capacities or as agents for others.

Such global “individuals,” it should be noted, also include those involved professionally in formal diplomacy. As representatives of governments, especially those of large and powerful countries, these individuals may speak weightily, with authority and often with considerable effect. I have particularly in mind following his recent retirement after twelve years of distinguished service as Dean of The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, the American diplomat, Ambassador Stephen W. Bosworth. Being aware as a historian of his long experience in the diplomatic field and interested, as a colleague, in his views on the subject, I have recollected a number of his comments, characteristically lapidary ones, that I thought noteworthy at the time and that have a bearing, both direct and indirect, on my present theme—the State-to-Self shift in the sphere of diplomatic representation.

Dean Bosworth, in his welcoming address at the 39th Meeting of the International Forum on Diplomatic Training—the annual gathering of the world’s diplomatic academies—that was held at the Fletcher School in September 2010 offered this definition of the group’s subject: “Diplomacy is the use of reasoned discourse combined with incentives and disincentives.” No doubt this definition reflected Ambassador Bosworth’s experience as a representative of a major power, indeed the world’s leading superpower. Concurrently with a period of his Deanship, Ambassador Bosworth served as U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy. I once asked him, with the distinction between the title of “Special Representative” and the lower-ranking “Special Envoy” in mind, how and to whom he “reported” in his role. His answer: “I report to the President through the Secretary of State.” An Envoy is head of a mission; a Representative is the representative of the head of state. Much of Ambassador Bosworth’s diplomatic experience involved dealing with authoritarian leaders, including Habib Bourguiba in Tunisia and Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines. In this respect, his role was traditional, reminiscent of the days of monarchical rulers.

Democratic diplomacy was another matter. In words that reminded me of George Kennan, the venerated American diplomat who also dealt with authoritarian regimes and who, being strict in his views, favored “a real career corps,” Dean Bosworth observed in remarks during his final Fletcher Class Day Ceremony: “Diplomacy does not come naturally to democracies, at least to this democracy.” As a professional he, like Kennan, valued rationality, consistency and continuity, and, perhaps especially in dealing with autocratic and secretive regimes, confidentiality. “I don’t really
know what ‘public diplomacy’ is,” I recall him once saying. Indeed, that term does seem oxymoronic to many, not only to professional diplomats, who consider that what they regularly do as diplomats has a public aspect to it. At the same time, possibly thinking about the role he played as ambassador of the United States during the “People Power Revolution” in the Philippines and the central role of public opinion in bringing that remarkable result about, and perhaps also his later role as U.S. ambassador to South Korea, with its sophisticated media interested in hearing his views, he commented, “An ambassador can do a lot.” As a “head of mission,” a position defined in the Vienna Convention Diplomatic Relations (VCDR), an ambassador is the focal point for a public as well as the principal contact point for the host government. Diplomacy does, still, begin and end at the top. But will it stay there?

**SOVEREIGNTY**

The concept of sovereignty is notoriously difficult to define. This is partly because it is not really a unitary notion, but, actually, a bundle of prerogatives and powers exercised in various functional areas. Sovereignty often is thought of in territorial terms, as “the quality of having independent authority over a geographic area.” Its reach, however, can extend far beyond a state’s boundaries. “Effective sovereignty” can be extraterritorial, even aggressively so. The Helms-Burton Act—formally, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996—is so viewed by many non-U.S. governments and firms. Multinational corporations, once thought to be so rich and powerful as to be able to hold sovereignty “at bay,” have found themselves increasingly subject to sovereign controls. Individual citizens, too, are subject to a state’s influence when abroad. Their passports can be rescinded. They may be extradited. They might even be brought home to do military service. And they can resist those controls.

As I see it, sovereignty today is, essentially, self-ownership and self-command. This broader idea still applies to states—polities that are independent. It can also be applied to individual persons—not only to kings or to presidents, but, arguably, to all persons having a strong sense of self-possession. The primary members of “the international community,” as that notion is generally understood today, still are the states—nearly all of them being members of the United Nations Organization. According to Article 2 of the UN Charter, “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members.” The preamble of that document, it should be remembered, begins “WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED...
NATIONS.” It is the sovereign “WE” who, on June 26, 1945, at the San Francisco Conference, empowered “our respective Governments, through representatives assembled,” to establish the international organization known as the United Nations. International society is thus a popular concept.

Since ancient times the powers of government often have been claimed on the basis of divine right, but they depend ultimately, in practical terms, on the willingness of a population to allow its rulers to exercise those powers. According to the Roman jurist Ulpian, it was the imperium of the people, who transferred it to the Emperor, which gave him the “command.” Jean Bodin in his 1576 Six Livres rejected this notion of the transference of sovereignty from the people. It was divine law and natural law that conferred upon the sovereign the right to rule—consistently with the law. Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan (1651) accepted Bodin’s notion of sovereignty as being absolute and perpetual but also introduced the new idea of a social contract. In order to overcome life that would otherwise be “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short,” people had to join in a “Common-wealth” and submit to a “Soveraigne Power.” Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his Du contrat social ou Principes du droit politique (1762) also declared the people themselves to be sovereign—and to remain so, without giving their power over to a monarch or other law-giver. Law was a continuous expression of the popular “general will” (volonté générale), of which the legislator was just a channel, or guide.

A common denominator of all of these contract-based theories is the image of the state as a composite—unitary but also containing and reflecting multitudes. This is wonderfully illustrated, in the original title page of Hobbes’s Leviathan, by the massive crowned figure representing the Sovereign, sword in one hand and crozier in the other, rising like a mountain above the Commonwealth’s territory [Figure 1]. Looked at closely, the “body” of the crowned figure reveals a myriad of small individual human bodies. This image is static. The population of the country is contained—territorially fixed—by the concept of the Commonwealth entity as sovereign. The actual social reality, in which there would have been internal movement, would have resembled a beehive, with persons moving about performing their individual and communal tasks. Yet the activity was local. How very different the reality is today, as I shall proceed to argue, when human activity is increasingly “international,” with outsiders coming in and
SOVEREIGNTY, DIPLOMACY, AND DEMOCRACY: THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF “INTERNATIONAL” REPRESENTATION—FROM STATE TO SELF?

Figure 1
insiders going out. The entire structure of a monumental, territorial Sovereign, with its powerful long arms and authoritarian stare, is being challenged by the forces of globalization. In such a changed context, could it be the individual Self that emerges on top rather than the communal State?

DIPLOMACY

Diplomacy, like sovereignty, is a vague and variable term. Many definitions have been offered.\(^1\) I myself shall define it, briefly and preliminarily, as the organized conduct of relations between states. This is consistent with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR), itself a product of an agreement drawn up by representatives of states.\(^1\) According to the VCDR’s preamble, the “States Parties” agreeing to it recall that “peoples of all nations” from ancient times have recognized “the status of diplomatic agents.”\(^5\) Thus there has long been a conceptual distinctness—and a requirement of formal treatment—that makes a diplomat different from an ordinary traveler, trader, or even other kind of emissary. Diplomats carry with themselves authority, and have attendant privileges and immunities. These are derived in part from the concept of sovereignty, of the notion that ambassadors are “personal representatives” of their sovereigns.\(^6\)

How “organized” does diplomacy actually have to be? Is a founding act—formal “establishment”—necessary? Must there be ministries of foreign affairs (MFAs)?\(^7\) Can other departments and agencies of government conduct “diplomacy”? Can even citizens, entirely outside government, do so, if their interests, purposes, and methods are “diplomatic” in character? Is it not the subject matter, as well as the kind of political authorization, that determines whether it is “diplomacy” that is being conducted?

Especially in a democracy and a democratizing world, the ordinary citizen has a much greater opportunity to engage directly in international exchange and policy discussion. In the United States the idea of “citizen diplomacy” was explicitly recognized, and in a sense also legitimized, by none other than President Dwight D. Eisenhower. At the White House Conference on Citizen Diplomacy held on September 11, 1956, Eisenhower announced a program that, when later privatized, became People to People International.\(^1\) “I have long believed, as have many before me,” he then said, “that peaceful relations between nations requires understanding and mutual respect between individuals.”\(^1\) The central concept of citizen diplomacy, as further developed by the U.S. Center for Citizen Diplomacy, is “that the individual has the right, even the responsibility, to help shape U.S. foreign relations ‘one handshake at a time.’”\(^2\)
The fundamental purpose of citizen diplomacy, like that of government-sponsored public diplomacy, may not be so different from the fifth and last-listed “function” of a diplomatic mission as outlined in the VCDR, namely: “Promoting friendly relations between the sending State and the receiving State, and developing their economic, cultural and scientific relations.”21 The target of citizen diplomacy however, is not the “states” of other countries but their “peoples.” It is a direct society-to-society interaction. In contrast with state-initiated public diplomacy, which also can involve engagement with foreign publics, its focus is on the role of the individual—the sovereign Self—acting and communicating abroad.

DEMOCRACY

The link between citizen diplomacy and global democracy, as already noted, is implied by the theory of liberalism, which emphasizes the individual’s freedom from artificial restraint—whether on physical movement, commercial enterprise, or intellectual and artistic expression. The very idea of interstate boundaries, necessary though they may be for numerous functional purposes, is itself theoretically questionable from a pure liberal perspective. Boundaries can be morally transgressed by assertive citizens. The National Council for International Visitors in Washington makes the democratic-diplomatic link explicit. In “a vibrant democracy” the individual has the right and even a duty to shape foreign relations.22 This may be especially the case when individuals belong to professional and other far-flung communities and thus have a “cosmopolitan” outlook.

Democracy, by definition, is rule by the people, a demos. In Europe today, with the European Union seeking to make policy for the populations of now twenty-eight member states, the problem is complicated by a “democratic deficit”—the widespread perception that the EU institutions, the directly elected European Parliament included, are not sufficiently representative. The question of the existence of a European demos is a profound one. Even advocates of “cosmopolitan democracy,” such as Daniele Archibugi, acknowledge that the concept’s relevance depends on the existence of a demos, of individuals who consider themselves as belonging to a single society. However, as Archibugi points out, peoples sense their solidarity in different, specific ways—“as ethnic groups, members of religious movements, and even as fans of a football team.” In policy spheres too, “there are different demois who are not clearly associated to states’ borders.” If “communities of fate” overlap, but do not coincide, it is “regressive to anchor in a static manner a political community to a
geographically delimited ‘population.’” It would be as if turning back to the Hobbesian Commonwealth.

To the cosmopolitan-democracy theorist, a society must be viewed in terms of its different levels of governance, conceived in functional as well as in hierarchical terms. At the local level there can be networks that are trans-border in their functionality. There can even be global dimensions to such networks. What this implies is that those materially interested and actually affected—stakeholders, whether citizens or not—be given greater authority over their lives. This can be done through devolution, through regional cooperation, and through global diplomacy, in the name of universal human rights. In some countries, non-nationals are allowed on this basis to vote in local elections.

**Diplomatic Representation**

What does the above—the democratic transition from sovereign to people—mean for diplomacy—more particularly, for the professional diplomat as representative? Whom does he (or, nowadays equally, she) represent? More profoundly, what does a country’s diplomat represent? And, further, what does this imply for how he (or she) does the representing? Does the method change?

There would seem to be, fundamentally, two ways of “representing.” One is through the practical demonstration of skill, that is, getting the job done—in a word, effectiveness. An example would be a diplomat delivering a démarche that brings about the desired change in the host government’s policy or behavior. Many present-day cases could be cited, including the efforts made by U.S. and EU representatives to moderate the actions of governments in the Middle East. The other is through symbolic action—“flying the flag,” so to speak, in various ways. Expressiveness, this might be called. Both kinds of representation are purposeful, to be carried out intentionally. Even modes of dress can be emblematic. In the historical case of Benjamin Franklin, emissary to the court of Louis XVI, the means of influence included conspicuously wearing a Quaker frock coat. Another was the rigid character and conduct of the “Jeffersonian” professor, William E. Dodd, whom President Franklin Roosevelt sent as U.S. ambassador to Nazi Germany. The two ways of representation—making a point and being the point itself—may or may not be mutually supportive. In Franklin’s case they were. In Dodd’s case they were not.

Within absolute monarchies, as earlier noted, the role of the ambassador was to represent the king. A one-for-one correspondence may even
have been assumed. But Paul Sharp notes skeptically: “If Michel Foucault
was right, medieval thought accepted the idea of direct correspondence,
one-for-one, far more readily than we do today.” Although having formally
received a royal appointment as “Her Britannic Majesty’s Ambassador,” a
diplomatic head of mission today may never have actually met, or will
ever meet, the state’s sovereign. Likewise, though less probable, a head of
mission may never or only rarely have a chance to talk substantively with
the head of state of the country to which he or she is accredited. The idea of
the ambassador-as-sovereign or bearer of sovereignty is a “fiction,” as Sharp
puts it. It rests on the even deeper fiction of the “division of the political
world into sovereigns and subjects.”

For the double-fiction to work—and indeed for the very concept of
diplomatic representation to work—some vestige of the past may need to
be retained. The “sovereign” idea has given diplomats many advantages,
including their presumption of immunity. Diplomats “may not think that
their symbolic status is necessary to function effectively (in which case they
are almost certainly wrong), but they do regard it as helpful,” observes
Sharp. But here, he continues, “problems begin in earnest: the idea of
embodying the state is seen as immodest, false, and dangerous in a demo-
ocratic and empiricist era replete with memories of the evils which can flow
from treating nations as real and states as ends rather than means.” Once
acknowledged, however, the idea of symbolic representation can either be
“cordoned off” or be “watered down”—cordoned off by restricting it to
relatively innocuous “ceremonial occasions” or watered down by viewing
diplomats as exemplifying or expressing only “national, cultural identity.”

If a diplomat responds simply, when asked, that he represents “my
government” or “my country,” what does that mean, exactly? If representa-
tion refers to *identity*, rather than to the state, significant complexity might
be indicated. Sharp mentions the Canadian diplomat, Marcel Cadieux,
born in Montreal of French Canadian parents who spent a notable career
in the federal service, becoming the first francophone ambassador of
Canada to the United States and then head of its mission to the European
Communities. Canada sees itself as a “binational, multicultural”
country, and it interacts with the world as such, belonging both to the
Commonwealth of Nations and to the Organisation Internationale de la
Francophonie. A Canadian diplomat has a dual, or even multiple, identity.

For the United States, what diplomats can also represent is *power*—
the country as, especially, a “great power,” the standard comparative-histor-
ical term for dominant Western states. In diplomacy itself, power as such
is rarely spoken of directly. It is implied—and meant to be inferred—or
just felt. The United States, with its nuclear arsenal and logistic capability, remains in a special category as the sole surviving “superpower.” The Soviet Union during the Cold War came within that category, too. Currently, however, Russia’s leadership favors the more historically resonant “great power.” Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who is an admirer of the tsarist-era foreign minister, Alexander Gorchakov, recalls how his predecessor achieved “the restoration of the Russian influence in Europe” after the defeat of the Crimean War—“exclusively through diplomacy,” without firing a shot. The Russian Federation’s veto prerogative as one of the five permanent members the United Nations Security Council is an institutionalized representation of Russia’s continuing greatness. It was understood by those who wrote the UN Charter, Lavrov insists, that “if one of the great powers objects, then the decision would not really be made because it wouldn’t work.”

Power can be represented negatively, and made effective that way.

A diplomat also can represent a country’s interests. “Protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State and of its nationals” is the second-listed function of a diplomatic mission in the VCDR. Some nations have very well defined conceptions of their geographical and other interests. France is such a one, with its strategic notions of “frontières naturelles” and “alliance de revers.” Talleyrand’s view of the servant of the French state, as Sharp epitomizes it, is “that Napoleons come and go but that the interests of France are eternal.” A diplomat should not only know his country’s interest; he should be able to state it, as Russia’s representatives still, emphatically, do today. Gorchakov was always saying that “openness is the key to success,” recalls Sergei Lavrov. “In foreign policy, you always have to lay down your interests bluntly, the way people will understand—and even if these interests do not coincide with the interests of your partner, even if those interests contradict the interests of your partner.”

Should not a diplomat also represent a country’s values? In some cases these are built into the very name of a state: the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, and the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, for example. Or, more distinctively, the State of Brunei, the Abode of Peace (Negara Brunei Darussalam). The formal diplomacy of these states is bound to express, on more than the rhetorical level, the values that are constitutive for them. Of course, the particular policies of a state’s government also need diplomatic articulation and require representation. In some cases, such as the post-9/11 “global war on terror” of the U.S. government under President George W. Bush, supporting the declared policy of the nation abroad was difficult for some American diplomats, even professionals who took the long view. Underneath
the “cynicism” that comes from being exceptionally well informed, reflects John Brady Kiesling, who was one of several U.S. Foreign Service officers who resigned in protest, was “a powerful sense of mission”—of American purpose in the world. “Most of us simplified the complex world: what was good for America and for us personally was also good for humankind in general.”  

But values transcended policy.

Some, perhaps even most diplomats believe, without necessarily saying so, that they represent not only their own countries’ national identity, power, interests, values, or policies but also the diplomatic system itself. This includes the principles of the VCDR—not just the privileges and immunities of diplomats but also the inviolability of diplomatic premises, in 1979 flagrantly challenged when the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was overrun. Diplomats themselves have been regarded as having a group identity, as if they belong to a guild—a “freemasonry” of internationalism. There is a risk in excessive cosmopolitanism. Paul Sharp gently faults a British member of the North Atlantic Council, Ambassador Frank Roberts, for stating that he, though “like any Ambassador, representative of his country,” also had a duty “to press upon London, when required, the collective views of the Council”—a collective responsibility. The European Union generates a similar collective ethos. Within the “late sovereign” European Union, as the Danish political scientist Rebecca Adler-Nissen characterizes the EU, the “very construction” of national positions increasingly takes place within the European Council and in Brussels.

Diplomats occupy an intermediate space between communities—their own and those to which they are accredited. They always have. They are in-between people, detached from home and yet not fully at home abroad. Their practical freedom from direct sovereign control allows them a certain leeway. They sometimes blur sovereign differences. “Diplomats see themselves as more aware than those they represent of the conceptual sand on which the international order is built and believe that it is their professional duty to let this awareness guide their actions,” writes Sharp. It is “the amateurs” who “take an idea like sovereignty literally and insist upon its implications uncompromisingly.” By contrast: “The professionals keep the notional world of sovereign states running by curbing the impulses to apply its principles too vigorously.” Occasionally, they can even “cheat” on the rules, in the larger interest. They can do so, Sharp suggests, “because,
thanks to their expertise and training, they do not inhabit the international world in quite the way the rest of us apparently do.”

This is most of all true of “multilateral” diplomats, those who represent their countries at international organizations, especially in the United Nations. National diplomats who themselves become international civil servants illustrate the phenomenon. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, previously foreign minister of South Korea, now speaks for all 193 members of the world body. His Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, Edmond Mulet, formerly was Guatemala’s ambassador to the United States and later to the European Union. When Mulet visited the Fletcher School, I asked him to comment, from his perspective, on “the difference” between being a national diplomat and an international civil servant. His answer: When you are a national diplomat, you represent your government. As an international civil servant, “you represent the [United Nations] Charter.”

Members of the European Commission speak and act on behalf of “Europe.” The thousands of fonctionnaires in Brussels owe their primary allegiance to the European Union. The same is true for the EU’s representatives abroad—the members of the new European Union External Action Service (EEAS). In composition, the EEAS is drawn, in thirds, from the staff of the Commission, the secretariat of the Council, and the diplomatic services of the member states. Its aim is to produce a “new diplomatic breed.”

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, also with twenty-eight members, has an international staff as well. It is no less diverse in composition. Being well-practiced, NATO operates with extraordinary efficiency, even when the purposes of the Alliance itself might not be clear in the world’s changing circumstances. Its senior military commander in Europe, until recently Admiral James Stavridis, serves both as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and, in his national capacity, as Commander of U.S. Forces in Europe (COMEUCOM)—a dual responsibility that General Eisenhower, its first holder, was initially reluctant to accept. A “multilateral” military officer, like an international organization’s diplomat, reports to and represents many heads, many “sovereigns.” A “democratic” representative in such a position can have a still wider role, reaching out to and informally reporting to national constituents and even a global public. Admiral Stavridis, a “huge consumer of social networks,” as SACEUR and COMEUCOM had more than 13,000 followers on Twitter and more than 10,000 friends on Facebook.

In reflecting upon the history of diplomatic representation to the present day, one sees, recurrently, the emergence of the individual Self even in the midst of sovereignty-oriented statecraft. As I noted at the outset,
this process, and trend, continues not only inside formal diplomacy but even entirely outside the sphere of the State. “International” representation is becoming an equal opportunity activity, as a review of a progression of selected thinkers on the subject will demonstrate, along with the tension that exists between State and Self in the diplomatic world that has vastly expanded.

NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI AND “COURT” DIPLOMACY

Modern diplomacy originated in Renaissance Italy. The Florentine statesman, Nicolò di Bernardo dei Machiavelli (1469-1527), is its exemplar. Best known for his treatise on politics, Il Principe, Machiavelli held high office in the Republic of Florence and also was a diplomat. The intense rivalry among the city-states of Italy during his time placed a high premium on the accurate discerning of rulers’ interests and intentions. Machiavelli’s governing standard of conduct was not Christian religion or principled truth but “verità effettuale”—the truth that gets results. Context—reading of immediate situations—was all-important. Diplomacy required involvement in court politics, where power lay. Gaining a favorable reputation there mattered, especially in the view of the receiving sovereign himself.

In his sage and still-pertinent letter of advice to the young Raffaello Girolami, to be sent as Florentine ambassador to Charles V of Spain, Machiavelli wrote that he who executes such a mission adequately “knows well the character of the sovereign to whom he is accredited, and that of those who govern him, and who knows best how to adapt himself to whatever may open and facilitate the way for a favorable reception.” It was important to act “on every occasion like a good and just man; to have the reputation of being generous and sincere, and to avoid that of being mean and dissembling, and not to be regarded as a man who believes one thing and says another,” he counseled. “And yet if it be sometimes necessary to conceal facts with words, then it should be done in such a manner that it shall not appear; or should it be observed, then a defence should be promptly ready.”

To gain access at the top, in a competitive diplomatic setting, remains an objective for a “bilateral” ambassador. “Court politics” exists even in the capitals of democracies. In the Washington, D.C., of John F. Kennedy—a “Camelot,” as some remember it—the ambassador of the United Kingdom, David Ormsby-Gore, was a particular favorite. “The Kennedys (to the irritation of the rest of the diplomatic corps) enjoyed no couple more than they did the Ormsby-Gores,” noted the White House special assistant...
and historian, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.\textsuperscript{48} Perhaps with this and other ambassadorial precedents in mind, Prime Minister Tony Blair’s chief of staff, Jonathan Powell, gave this instruction to Christopher Meyer, the new Labour government’s choice to be its emissary to Washington: “We want you to get up the arse of the White House and stay there.” By Meyer’s own account, he did gain influence. However, he came to feel that, as a result of doing so, 10 Downing Street, which developed its own “selfish” relationship with the White House, viewed him almost as a rival.\textsuperscript{49}

\textbf{CARDINAL RICHELIEU, FRANÇOIS DE CALLIÈRES, AND FRENCH DIPLOMACY}

Armand Jean du Plessis (1585-1642), Cardinal-Duke of Richelieu, was chief minister of Louis XIII. He systematized the foreign relations of France, including its diplomatic representation abroad. Intellectually, Richelieu’s “system,” articulated in his \textit{ Testament politique}, was based on \textit{raison d’état}—the interests of State, expressed through the will of the Sovereign, being its touchstone. Richelieu is credited with creating, in 1626, the first ministry of foreign affairs.\textsuperscript{50} Most importantly, he laid down the principle of “uninterrupted foreign negotiations”—the wisdom of having continuous, even universal diplomatic relations. From experience, Richelieu found it “absolutely necessary to the well-being of the state to negotiate ceaselessly, either openly or secretly, and in all places, even in those from whom no future prospects as yet seem unlikely.”\textsuperscript{51}

Along with centralized management went strict discipline. Cardinal Richelieu stressed the need “to be discerning in the choice of ambassadors and other negotiators,” and further believed that “one cannot be too severe in punishing those who exceed their authority, since by such misdeeds they compromise the reputation of princes as well as the fortunes of states.” The “irresponsibility” or “corruptness” of some and the “consuming ambition” of others “to accomplish something” may cause them, unless “held within bounds prescribed in terms of fear and the threat of utter condemnation,” to be “drawn into the making of a bad treaty rather than none at all.” The competitive Self of an errant ambassador could threaten the integrity of State policy.

Building upon the legacy of Richelieu, whom he considered “the model for all statesmen,” François de Callières (1645-1717), served Louis XIV, particularly in handling relations with the Dutch. In his evergreen essay, \textit{De la manière de négocier avec les Souverains} (1716), Callières posits: “The art of negotiation with princes is so important that the fate of the
greatest states often depends upon the good or bad conduct of negotiations and upon the degree of capacity in the negotiators employed.”52

Callières addresses the character of representation explicitly. Observing that novices in diplomacy “become easily intoxicated with honours done in their person to the dignity of their royal master,” he comments: “They are like the ass in the fable who received for himself all the incense burned before the statue of the goddess which he bore on his back.” Some posturing, of course, is necessary for a diplomat. Indeed an ambassador “resembles in a certain sense the actor placed before the eyes of the public in order that he may play a great part, for his profession raises him above the ordinary condition of mankind and makes him in some sort the equal of the masters of the earth by that right of representation which attaches to his service.” He therefore must “be able to simulate a dignity even if he possesses it not; but this obligation is the rock upon which many an astute negotiator has perished because he did not know in what his dignity consisted.”53

HAROLD NICOLSON AND THE “NEW DIPLOMACY”

The British diplomat and man of letters, Sir Harold Nicolson (1886-1968), author of the Diplomacy and The Evolution of Diplomatic Method as well as Peacemaking 1919 and other works known to students of the subject, was a transitional figure in a time of transition. During his life he experienced the shift from the old diplomacy to a “new diplomacy,” as he called it. An admirer of French diplomacy, he began with a traditional definition: “Diplomacy essentially is the organized system of negotiation between sovereign states.”54

Negotiation within the diplomatic system, Nicolson believed, is based on “the element of representation—the essential necessity in any negotiator that he should be fully representative of his own sovereign at home.” In Nicolson’s time, new ideas of sovereignty were emerging. These included the concept of plural sovereignty developed by the British political scientist Harold J. Laski and others, according to which the locus of sovereignty in a society shifts from one place or one group (or alliance of groups) to another.55 Nicolson probably was responsive to this thinking. As the historian T. G. Otte points out, “There was no doubt in Nicolson’s mind that the professional diplomatist was the representative and servant of the sovereign authority of his state, whatever the latter’s political form might be” (emphasis added). The “efficiency” of diplomacy depended on its being reflective of society. In “the age of the common man,” international
relations were going to be “conducted on democratic lines.” Consent rather than authority—royal prerogative based on divine right or natural law—became both source and sanction for the “new diplomacy.” Moreover, leaders, and perhaps diplomats too, were obliged to inform the general public—the “sovereign” electorate—of their aims and their methods. “Public opinion” had become “a constant, rather than intermittent factor” in the making of foreign policy. Nicolson accepted this, but regretted it. Diplomats were knowledgeable and expert. The public was not. Not being well informed, the general public was likely to react to events emotionally rather than rationally.

Nicolson was critical, too, of another aspect of the “new diplomacy”: conference diplomacy—meetings of political leaders themselves. The political Self was distorting long-term State interests—and displacing the professional diplomat. The function of a diplomatic service was that of “a filter in the turgid stream of international relations,” in his view. “Direct contact between British and foreign statesmen dispenses with that filter.” He admitted that “the rush of water is thereby rendered more potent and more immediate,” yet “the conduct of foreign policy requires no gush or rush.” It requires “deliberation, experience and detachment.”

HENRY KISSINGER AND “LINKAGE” DIPLOMACY

Henry Kissinger was born Heinz Alfred Kissinger in Fürth, Germany, in 1923. Both as a scholar and as a diplomat, he owes a great deal intellectually to Germany’s Iron Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, whom he characterized in a study as a “white revolutionary.”\(^{56}\) Bismarck, in the service of the Prussian king, later German emperor, overturned the existing European order based on the principle of “legitimacy. What Kissinger writes of Bismarck’s “new Germany” can be applied to the United States as he—under the presidential aegis of Richard M. Nixon—conceived and also conducted its foreign policy. It was “tailored to a genius who proposed to direct the forces he had unleashed, both foreign and domestic, by manipulating their antagonisms—a task he mastered but which proved beyond the capacity of his successors.”\(^{57}\) His was a “great man” theory of international relations—the Self almost above all.\(^{58}\)

The Nixon-Kissinger strategy for ending the Cold War, and extricating the United States from war in Indochina was, through skillful diplomacy, to exploit the antagonism between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. The two men agreed that, as Kissinger explained their shared belief, “if relations could be developed with both the Soviet Union
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and China the triangular relationship would give us great strategic opportunity for peace.” The factor of diplomacy by itself could hardly accomplish such a result. “Triangular diplomacy, to be effective, must rely on the natural incentives and propensities of the players,” Kissinger well realized. “The hostility between China and the Soviet Union served our purposes best if we maintained closer relations with each side than they did with each other. The rest could be left to the dynamic of events.”59

“Events,” however, could be arranged. A master of bureaucratic infighting and an adroit manipulator of personal relations, Kissinger in the White House managed to gain effective control of the Nixon administration’s foreign policy apparatus—and to ignore it when he and the even more Machiavellian chief wanted, as in seeking an opening for direct contact with the People’s Republic of China. “Transparency is an essential objective, but historic opportunities for building a more peaceful international order have imperatives as well,” as Kissinger rationalized this, in a Bismarckian sense, revolutionary diplomatic move.60

Relations with Moscow also were conducted secretly from the White House, with Kissinger communicating directly with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin through the “backchannel.” With all lines of policy coming to a focus in the Office of the Presidency, it was possible, at least imaginatively, à la Richelieu, to manage the overall U.S. relationship with the Soviet Union tightly through a broad-front strategy of “linkage”—that is, interrelating issues across different sectors and areas of negotiation in order to maximize leverage. This approach ran against the American “pragmatic” tradition, Kissinger noted, of “examining issues separately: to solve problems on their merits, without a sense of time or context or the seamless web of reality.”61

Jorge Heine and “Network” Diplomacy

Jorge Sievert Heine Lorenzen—a Chilean political scientist and diplomat born in Santiago in 1948—served as Chile’s ambassador first to South Africa and then to India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. Thus he may be viewed as a representative of the global South, as well as a Latin American and a middle power. Critical of the traditional “club model” of diplomacy, founded on the principle of national sovereignty and conducted according to creaky conventions, Heine advocates replacing it with the less-hierarchical “network model”—flatter, less formal, more open, and much farther-reaching. In a graceful and thought-provoking essay, On the Manner of
Practising the New Diplomacy (2006), whose title pays tribute to Callières, he argues that, rather than “representation,” which is too passive, diplomats should think of what they do as “projection”—actively instilling their country in a host nation. This more dynamic approach that Heine recommends entails meeting more of the “players” of the country, well beyond the foreign ministry and even the government. More parties, some of whom “would never have thought of setting foot in the rarefied atmosphere of the salons and private clubs the diplomats of yester-year used to frequent,” needed to be engaged. They dealt with finance and other non-traditional matters—and at multicontinental distances. “More and more,” reasons Heine, “diplomacy is becoming ‘complexity management,’ to a degree earlier master practitioners like Cardinal Richelieu would not have imagined.”

The new setting of diplomacy today is not just the result of “democraticization,” the growing number of relevant actors that have to be taken into consideration. It is also, Heine explains, a result of the increased “interpenetration” of societies—at the cultural level as well as on political and economic levels. “All of this is leading to a progressive ‘hollowing out’ of traditional diplomatic duties,” he concludes, “sometimes leaving the impression of diplomats as mere ‘coordinators’ of the substantive activities of other agencies.” The situation can be corrected if diplomats take the initiative in developing new constituencies—as he himself apparently did for Chile—by making “direct links between missions and their home state’s own regions and localities,” thereby showing that “diplomats on the ground actually help to generate jobs.” This solution requires understanding that it is “no longer enough to count on the good will of the ‘Prince.’”62 The inventive diplomat Self could reinvent diplomacy itself.

MANUEL CASTELLS AND “THE PUBLIC’S” DIPLOMACY

Manuel Castells Oliván, a Spanish sociologist born in the province of Albacete in 1942, is currently a professor at the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Southern California (USC). A “global thinker” and theoretician of the information society, rather than a commentator on diplomacy as such, Castells is skeptical of the very idea of government as it exists today. In fact he sees political systems as engulfed “in a structural crisis of legitimacy,” being increasingly isolated from the citizenry. For him, it is social identity, rather than state interest, that really matters. “In a world of global flows of wealth, power, and images, the search for identity, collective or individual, ascribed or constructed, becomes the
fundamental source of social meaning.” People increasingly organize “not around what they do but on the basis of what they are, or believe they are,” Castells observes. However, “global networks of instrumental exchanges selectively switch on and off individuals, groups, regions, and even countries, according to their relevance in fulfilling the goals processed in the network”—the globalizing webs that are replacing vertically integrated hierarchies, including structures of government. It follows therefore: “Our societies are increasingly structured around a bipolar opposition between the Net and the Self.”

The media, Castells argues, today have become “the social space where power is decided.” He sees the development of networks of communication, being horizontal and becoming more interactive, as having “induced the rise of a new form of communication, mass self-communication”—many-to-many, peer-to-peer interaction (p2p). Most web logs, or blogs, are “of a personal character,” and may even be closer to “electronic autism” than to actual communication. Mass self-communication, by contrast, is “a new form of socialized communication.” It potentially reaches a global audience through p2p networks. As digitization allows reformatting, it is multimodal. “And it is self-generated in content, self-directed in emission, and self-selected in reception by many that communicate with many.” Its importance is that it enables “insurgent politics and social movements” to “intervene more decisively” in the communication space—to oppose the exercise of power by corporate media, and governments too, with “counter-power” projects.

What is the relevance of the above theory for diplomacy? Governments—and diplomats—are bypassed in it. People and peoples represent themselves—communicating directly with each other. “Public diplomacy,” writes Castells in a contribution to a volume edited by Geoffrey Cowan and Nicholas J. Cull of USC’s Center on Public Diplomacy, “is not government diplomacy… Public diplomacy is the diplomacy of the public, that is, the projection in the international arena of the values and ideas of the public.” The resulting “public debate could inform the emergence of a new form of consensual global governance”—“de facto global governance without a global government.”

A key factor in Castells’s scheme is “the rise of a global civil society.” However, it may be critically noted that “global civil society,” when examined, turns out to consist largely of international NGOs and single-issue activist groups. An illustrative case of civil-society action mentioned by Castells is the movement that brought about the Ottawa Treaty—the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. The International Campaign to Ban
Landmines (ICBL) and Jody Williams, its founding coordinator, jointly were awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1997. The award was a recognition of individual initiative—the Self—and also of the efficacy of e-mail as a facilitator of social communication, even mass self-communication. In his recent book, *Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age*, Castells tests his hypothesis of emerging consensual governance through mass self-communication, comparing a diverse set of cases: Iceland’s Kitchenware Revolution, Tunisia’s “Revolution of Liberty and Dignity,” the Internet-mediated revolution in Egypt, the rise of the Indignadas in Spain, and, within the United States, the Occupy Wall Street movement. All of these movements, he finds, “share a specific culture, the culture of autonomy.”

“Autonomy” can refer to both individual and collective selves. It “refers to the capacity of a social actor to become a subject by defining its action around projects constructed independently of the institutions of society, according the values and interests of the social actor,” as Castells defines it. The Internet “provides the organizational communication platform to translate the culture of freedom” into the actual practice of autonomy.” It was “too early,” Castells concedes, to evaluate the ultimate outcome of the social movements that he describes in *Networks of Outrage and Hope*. Yet it appeared to him that “a possible legacy” was democracy. “A new form of democracy. An old aspiration, never fulfilled, of humankind.”

**DOMINANCE OF REPRESENTATION OF THE STATE OR BY THE SELF IN THE NEW DIGITAL AGE?**

“Soon everyone on Earth will be connected.” So predict Eric Schmidt, executive chairman of Google, and Jared Cohen, a fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations, in *The New Digital Age: Reshaping the Future of People, Nations and Business*. They argue that citizens, as individuals and presumably as a massed citizenry, will have more power than at any other time in history. What will be the consequences for the State, and for state-conducted diplomacy? “The near monopoly of power once enjoyed by sovereign entities is being eroded,” wrote Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, in 2006. His focus then was on the challenge posed for “the 190-plus states” by “a larger number of powerful non-sovereign and at least partly (and often largely) independent actors” that range from corporations to NGOs, from terrorist groups to drug cartels, and from regional and global institutions to banks and private equity funds. Today the individual citizen—the private person—also is in
a position to challenge state control, not as in the case of Edward Snowden so much through direct confrontation of the state as through what Manuel Castells calls mass self-communication, conducted entirely aside from and around it.

For the institution of diplomacy this development can have profound consequences. Nowadays individual persons represent themselves to the world, through Facebook and other social media. They post photographs and personal profiles—“identities”—in ways not wholly unlike the manner in which states, too, now are posting images and promoting national “brands.” What is being projected publicly may be less the actual person than a persona—a “Second Self,” as the M.I.T. psychologist of technology Sherry Turkle has characterized it. People “edit” themselves online, if not as carefully as ministries and embassies must do when communicating via the Internet. As the media analyst Alexis Wichowski, working as an adviser in the Office of Press and Public Diplomacy of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, has pointed out, diplomats, like others, now use Twitter but their tweets are “almost always intentional and carefully considered.” They “know that anything they say, out loud or online, can be construed as a statement of policy.”

Unlike formal diplomatic communication between state representatives, individual or mass self-communication that is entirely private mostly ignores “international” lines—except when these may be emphasized by governments attempting to block communication by jamming radio broadcasts or cutting off Internet access. In contrast with the image of the giant Sovereign-figure on the cover of Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan—a “Commonwealth” whose form contains all of the state’s population—a social graph from Facebook, a network of individuals with their faces shown, indicates no political boundaries whatsoever [Figure 2]. It could be worldwide in scope. On a social-networked globe, persons (“netizens”) communicate directly, and cluster independently, and in new and unpredictable patterns.

Can there be, in a globalized world, “Diplomacy without Diplomats?,” as the American diplomat George Kennan asked in a Foreign Affairs article.
in 1997. In the era then “already upon us” of “rapidly decentralizing government and broadly diffused authority,” Kennan concluded with apparent resignation, “perhaps the present foreign service, lacking the rigidities of earlier conceptions, will do as well as any.” Today’s diplomats, living in an “egalitarian” age, do need to engage publicly. To a degree, they always have. Paul Sharp cites as an example Lord Carnock (Harold Nicolson’s father)
who as Britain’s plenipotentiary in Morocco “spent at least some of his time while in Tangier building local coalitions to oppose the deforestation of the surrounding hills by charcoal burners.”

Seclusion and secrecy limit the diplomat. As Kennan himself observed nearly sixty years ago, in words quoted by Alexis Wichowski: “A large part of a diplomatic mission’s work does not involve or require elaborate secrecy. Diplomacy, after all, is not a conspiracy.” She adds: “The point of diplomatic communication has always been to clearly deliver a message.” Recognizing, however, that there is “risk” involved for diplomats in using social media, she emphasizes the benefits: “Diplomatic tweets can make government more interesting, coaxing officials into having real interactions with the broader public: diplomats speak to citizens, and the citizens speak back.”

Does this mean a new sort of diplomat is required? A new kind of “international” representative, a man or woman with computer skills and a new, more popular orientation, and perhaps even greater independence in expressing policy? The circumstances in which diplomats find themselves do often require quick responses, suited to immediate situations, which they do know far better than do most officials back in their capitals. I once too-boldly commented to Ambassador Bosworth that the United States today doesn’t really have a foreign policy, in an overall sense, and that American diplomats in the field, rather than policy makers, are supplying it, de facto. While it is true that there may no specific instructions that are appropriate, there are always, the Dean said in reply, “certain principles” that provide guidance. In the case of American diplomacy, those principles include democracy and the rule of law. U.S. diplomats must adhere to them.

The scholar Paul Sharp, taking a long view of the trajectory of diplomacy, emphasizes its essentially statist character. “Diplomats should remind themselves and others that they are first and foremost the representatives of sovereign states, that this is their raison d’être and a precondition for anything else they might aspire to be or to do.” Sharp does take non-state factors and new conditions into account. “This might require an adjustment in their professional orientation but not a transformation.”

The State has a symbolic function that is vital. Such powerful units as “France” are needed to make and to carry out international agreements. To be sure, as Richard Haass points out, today “states must be prepared to cede some sovereignty to world bodies if the international system is to function” in addressing major common problems such as global climate change.

Today “world bodies,” including those of the United Nations system,
are not only representative of states but also reflective of civil society. There is nonetheless, as Sharp rightly insists, a fundamental difference between a governmental delegate, with official responsibility, and a private person acting as an advocate—ultimately, between the sovereign State and the autonomous Self. The difference is not just formal. It is also functional. “A world of states whose citizens possessed the consciousness of diplomats would be unrepresentable,” writes Sharp, “and a world of states whose diplomats possessed the consciousness of citizens would be unmanageable.”

Representation—being—and management—doing—are twin necessities of today’s world. There are diverse social identities and complex policy issues. Diplomacy is at the forefront of both of these challenges. In reconciling the former and resolving the latter, as Stephen Bosworth might say, diplomacy—and the diplomat—“can do a lot.”

ENDNOTES
4 Congress was prompted by the action of a Pennsylvania Quaker, Dr. George Logan, who met in Paris with Talleyrand and other Directory officials during the Quasi-War with France. The Logan Act has never actually been enforced, although it has been used informally to dissuade private peacemakers.
6 He recounts his role in Seoul during the 1997-1998 financial crisis and later during the South Korean leader Kim Dae-jung’s efforts to implement a “sunshine” policy toward North Korea in Chapter 6 of Ambassadors’ Memoir: U.S. Korean Relations Through the Eyes of the Ambassadors (Washington, DC: Korea Economic Institute, 2009), 106-28.
10 This origin of this notion in liberalism is apparent. It also can be seen to have roots in anarchism. See, for example, L. Susan Brown, *The Politics of Individualism: Liberalism, Liberal Feminism and Anarchism* (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1993).
15 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
21 Article 3(e), Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
29 Sharp, “Who needs diplomats?”
30 Sharp, “Who needs diplomats?”
35 Sharp, “Who needs diplomats?”
36 Glasser, “‘The Law of Politics’ According to Sergei Lavrov.”
41 Edmond Mulet, talk at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, December 3, 2012. See also “Fletcher Forum Interview with Mr. Edmond Mulet,” http://fletcher-forum.org/2012/12/18/mulet.
51 This and the quotations below are from “Richelieu: Political Testament,” in Berridge, ed., *Diplomatic Classics*, 115-21.
52 François de Callières, *On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes; on the Uses of Diplomacy; the Choice of Ministers and Envoys; and the Personal Qualities necessary for...*
Success in Missions abroad (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963), 7. This finds a modern, and perhaps conscious, echo in the arresting opening statement of a book by the American diplomat: Monteagle Stearns, Talking to Strangers: Improving American Diplomacy at Home and Abroad (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), xiii: “Diplomacy is both servant to and master of foreign policy: servant because the diplomat’s role is to carry out the instructions of political policymakers, master because what the diplomat cannot accomplish, policymakers will usually have to do without.”

53 Callières, On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes, 9, 21-22.

54 This and subsequent quotations from Nicolson can be found in T. G. Otte, “Nicolson,” in Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger, ed. G. T. Berridge, Maurice Keens-Soper, and T. G. Otte (Basingstoke, U.K.: Palgrave, 2001), 151-80, a fine essay drawing from the above-mentioned and many other, lesser-known writings of Nicolson on diplomatic topics.


57 Kissinger, Diplomacy, 105.


61 Kissinger, White House Years, 129-30.

62 Jorge Heine, On the Manner of Practising the New Diplomacy, Working Paper No. 11, The Centre for International Governance Innovation (October 2006), 1-2, 3, 4-5, 7-9, 12, 18, and passim.


70 Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope, 244-45.


76 http://steve-dale.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Facebook-Social-Graph.png.

77 Kennan, “Diplomacy Without Diplomats?”: 212.

78 Sharp, “Who needs diplomats?”

79 Wichowski, “Social Diplomacy.”

80 Sharp, “Who needs diplomats?”

81 Haass, “Sovereignty and Globalisation.”

82 Sharp, “Who needs diplomats?”